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PUBLIC CHARGE AS DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
Alessandra N . Rosales*
Public charge is a ground of inadmissibility based upon the likelihood that a
noncitizen will become dependent on government benefits in the future . Once
designated as a public charge, a noncitizen is ineligible to be admitted to the
United States or to obtain lawful permanent residence . In August 2019, the
Trump Administration published a regulation regarding this inadmissibility
ground . Among its mandates, the rule expanded the definition of a public
charge to include any noncitizen who receives one or more public benefits for
more than twelve months in a thirty-six-month period . It also instructed
immigration officers to weigh medical conditions that “interfere” with the
noncitizen’s ability to care for themselves in favor of finding the noncitizen to
be a public charge . The rule prompted several legal challenges, including un-
der section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the predecessor to the Americans
with Disabilities Act . While these claims address the core legal arguments of
disability discrimination, the scope of violations should be viewed more
broadly . This Comment assesses the public charge rule from a disability
rights perspective, exploring the intersection between disability and immigra-
tion law, and concludes that immigrants with disabilities no longer had ac-
cess to federal programs to which they were entitled, and consequently, access
to the United States itself .
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INTRODUCTION
Maria Isabel Bueso, a California resident, immigrated from Guatemala
as a child in 2003 for treatment of her rare genetic disease, mucopolysaccha-
ridosis type VI.1 Doctors had invited her to participate in a clinical trial, and
due in part to her participation, the Food and Drug Administration ap-
proved a medication that significantly improved the survival rates of indi-
viduals with the disease.2 In August 2019, the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) terminated a program for immigrants like
Bueso that granted them “deferred action” while they received lifesaving
medical treatment.3 The government told Bueso that she and her family had
to leave within thirty-three days or face deportation to Guatemala.4 Several
members of Congress wrote a letter to Acting Secretary of Homeland Security
Kevin McAleenan criticizing USCIS’s decision to eliminate medical deferred
action.5 While Bueso has since been granted approval to remain in the Unit-
ed States for two more years,6 her case highlights the perilous intersection
between immigration and disability.
Bueso is one of countless immigrants with a disability.7 Existing immi-
gration law disparately affects immigrants with disabilities, particularly
1. Miriam Jordan & Caitlin Dickerson, Sick Migrants Undergoing Lifesaving Care Can





5. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, More than 100 Lawmakers Denounce Decision To End
Program for Sick Immigrants, CBS NEWS (Aug. 30, 2019, 4:18 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com
/news/medical-deferred-action-more-than-100-lawmakers-decry-decision-to-stop-health-
program-for-sick-immigrants [https://perma.cc/CPZ3-PQ5T].
6. Farida Jhabvala Romero, Concord Woman with Rare Disease Granted Reprieve from
Deportation, KQED (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/news/11790433/concord-woman-
with-rare-disease-granted-reprieve-from-deportation [https://perma.cc/CHQ4-6DZ2].
7. While there is no data on the number of immigrants with disabilities, 13.5 million
Medicaid or CHIP enrollees are noncitizens or are in a household with a noncitizen. Samantha
Artiga, Rachel Garfield & Anthony Damico, Estimated Impacts of Final Public Charge Inadmis-
sibility Rule on Immigrants and Medicaid Coverage, KFF (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.kff.org
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through the inadmissibility ground known as “public charge.” Prior to Au-
gust 2019, a noncitizen was designated as a public charge if a consular officer
or other immigration officer determined that the individual was likely to
primarily rely on government support for subsistence.8 As a public charge,
this individual is ineligible for admission into the United States and legal
permanent residence.9 On August 14, 2019, however, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) published the Inadmissibility on Public Charge
Grounds Final Rule (the Final Rule), which further magnified the impact of
this law on people with disabilities.10 This rule concerned the designation of
public charge status for individuals seeking adjustment of status, extension
of stay, or change of status.11 Under the Final Rule, the Trump Administra-
tion expanded the definition of a public charge to include noncitizens who
receive one or more public benefits for more than twelve months within any
thirty-six-month period.12 This expanded definition raised the question of
whether the Final Rule violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability, and if so, to what extent it
affected immigrants with disabilities.
Disability issues within immigration law are not often addressed by legal
scholarship.13 Moreover, they have only been fleetingly addressed by the
courts, even though some plaintiffs raised Rehabilitation Act claims in their
challenges to the Final Rule.14 With a focus on public charge as a ground of
inadmissibility, this Comment seeks to highlight the breadth of the Final
Rule’s section 504 violations, presenting an analysis of the Final Rule
through a disability rights lens. In doing so, it reads the rule as more than
/report-section/estimated-impacts-of-final-public-charge-inadmissibility-rule-on-immigrants-
and-medicaid-coverage-key-findings [https://perma.cc/RG4H-8HE6].
8. Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64
Fed. Reg. 28,689 (Mar. 26, 1999).
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4).
10. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 212–14, 245, 248).
11. Id . Adjustment of status is the process through which a nonimmigrant visa holder
applies for an immigrant visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1255. Through an extension of stay, a noncitizen may
increase the duration of their stay in the United States. See id . § 1184. Change of status allows a
noncitizen to change from one nonimmigrant visa to another. Id . § 1258.
12. Public Charge, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (last updated Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/public-charge
[https://perma.cc/JR2C-4VEH].
13. Much of the scholarship in this area focuses on immigrants with mental disabilities.
See, e .g ., Aliza B. Kaplan, Disabled and Disserved: The Right to Counsel for Mentally Disabled
Aliens in Removal Proceedings, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 523 (2012); Joren Lyons, Comment, Men-
tally Disabled Citizenship Applicants and the Meaningful Oath Requirement for Naturalization,
87 CALIF. L. REV. 1017 (1999). Regarding the Final Rule, Professor Mark C. Weber discusses its
parallels with Hobby Lobby and explains that federal law supersedes federal regulation when
the two conflict. Mark C. Weber, Of Immigration, Public Charges, Disability Discrimination,
and, of All Things, Hobby Lobby, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 245 (2020).
14. E .g ., Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (E.D. Wash.
2019).
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mere immigration regulation: in contravention of section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act, the Final Rule effectively denied individuals with disabilities ac-
cess to public benefits and the liberty to be admitted or remain in the United
States. Although the Biden Administration has since retreated from the Final
Rule,15 its implementation (and survival) signals the troubling perpetuity of
disability discrimination in immigration law. Part I provides an overview of
the public charge ground prior to the 2019 change, the development of the
Final Rule from notice-and-comment to nationwide implementation to its
demise, and the framework of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Part II
assesses the Final Rule from a disability rights standpoint by examining the
access/content doctrine, eugenics, and the role of social welfare in the lives of
those with disabilities. Part II also identifies public health as a policy concern
that supports this Comment’s conclusion that the Final Rule brazenly dis-
criminated against immigrants with disabilities.
I. PUBLIC CHARGE AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
In a radio interview, then Acting USCIS Director Ken Cuccinelli16 re-
vised the renowned words etched onto the Statue of Liberty from “Give me
your tired, [give me] your poor”17 to “[G]ive me your tired and your poor
who can stand on their own two feet and who will not become a public
charge.”18 From childhood, Americans are indoctrinated with a rosy view of
immigration at Ellis Island,19 but immigration regulation reflects a much
more nuanced story.
Public charge doctrine, until recently, has not been the subject of public
discourse regarding immigration law. This Part traces the historical evolu-
tion of the public charge ground of inadmissibility to its culmination in the
Final Rule and outlines the Rehabilitation Act. Section I.A introduces the or-
igins of the public charge ground and its amendments by the Supreme
Court, Congress, and the Board of Immigration Appeals. Section I.B discuss-
es the contours of the Final Rule and subsequent litigation. Section I.C de-
scribes section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
15. Joint Stipulation to Dismiss, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, No. 20-449,
2021 WL 666376 (U.S. dismissed Mar. 9, 2021).
16. In March 2020, a federal court ruled that Cuccinelli’s appointment as acting director
of USCIS violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1
(D.D.C. 2020).
17. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, POETRY FOUND., https://www.poetryfoundation
.org/poems/46550/the-new-colossus [https://perma.cc/5HQ3-AJ83].
18. Rule Would Penalize Immigrants to U .S . for Needing Benefits, NPR (Aug. 13, 2019,
7:23 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/13/750727515/rule-would-penalize-immigrants-to-u-
s-for-needing-benefits [https://perma.cc/7SPD-BSJH].
19. E .g ., EVE BUNTING, DREAMING OF AMERICA: AN ELLIS ISLAND STORY (1999).
May 2021] Public Charge as Disability Discrimination 1617
A. History of Public Charge
There are two categories of noncitizens: immigrants and nonimmi-
grants.20 Immigrants, or legal permanent residents, may remain and work in
the United States on a long-term basis.21 Nonimmigrants have temporary
visas to come as students, tourists, seasonal workers, and the like.22 To come
to the United States, a noncitizen must be eligible for a nonimmigrant or
immigrant visa and be admissible.
According to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), “admission”
is the lawful entry of a noncitizen into the United States “after inspection
and authorization by an immigration officer.”23 The INA enumerates the ex-
clusion grounds that render noncitizens ineligible for admission to the Unit-
ed States unless a waiver applies.24 The provisions apply to noncitizens
outside the United States seeking admission, noncitizens who entered with-
out inspection,25 and noncitizens within the borders who are applying for
permanent residence.26 Public charge is one of these grounds of inadmissibil-
ity.27
Over time, changes in immigration law have been prompted by an aver-
sion to certain kinds of immigrants. Laws regarding public charge shifted
from the overt exclusion of immigrants with disabilities to exclusion by
proxy. Under the “proxy” scheme, the focus was reliance on government as-
sistance, which indirectly envelops immigrants whose disabilities necessitate
costly healthcare and other public benefits.28 But even so, as long as the im-
migrant was not primarily dependent on government assistance, they were
not deemed to be a public charge—until the Trump Administration began to
implement its policies in 2018.
While public charge doctrine was initially nebulous, Congress and the
courts further defined it over time. In the Immigration Act of 1882, Con-
gress enacted “public charge” as an exclusion ground, prohibiting the admis-
20. Requirements for Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visas, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROT. (last updated Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-visitors/visa-waiver
-program/requirements-immigrant-and-nonimmigrant-visas [https://perma.cc/WQY5-
QHKZ].
21. There are three primary categories of immigrants: family-sponsored, employment-
based, and diversity-based. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a). Immigrants are also eligible to become U.S. citi-
zens after three to five years; in contrast, nonimmigrants are ineligible for naturalization. Id .
§§ 1427(a), 1430(a).
22. Id . § 1184 (providing a comprehensive list of nonimmigrant visa categories).
23. Id . § 1101(a)(13)(A).
24. Id . § 1182(a).
25. Id . § 1182(a)(6)(A) (providing that a noncitizen who has not been admitted is sub-
ject to the grounds of inadmissibility). Noncitizens who enter without inspection are subject to
the grounds of exclusion, as they have not yet been admitted. Id . § 1225(a)(1).
26. Id . § 1255(a).
27. Id . § 1182(a)(4).
28. See id . § 1182(a).
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sion of “any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becom-
ing a public charge.”29 While the statute did not define “public charge,” it
explicitly excluded “any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take
care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge” from admis-
sion.30 This legislation was passed in response to Henderson v . Mayor of New
York,31 in which the Supreme Court held that state regulation of immigra-
tion through taxation of immigrants was unconstitutional,32 leaving states
without a direct source with which to fund the cost of immigrants. The 1882
Act also established an “immigrant fund” to provide “for the care of immi-
grants arriving in the United States,” signaling that a noncitizen was not con-
sidered a public charge merely for receiving some public assistance.33
In 1907, Congress enacted an immigration statute that designated “pau-
pers” and “professional beggars” as likely to become public charges.34 The
Supreme Court subsequently stated that a noncitizen is likely to become a
public charge due to their “permanent” personal characteristics; the condi-
tions of the city in which admission is sought do not affect the public charge
determination.35 In the wake of the enactment of sweeping social welfare leg-
islation in the 1930s,36 the Board of Immigration Affairs articulated a test to
determine whether an individual is a public charge: (1) a noncitizen is
charged for services rendered to them under law, thereby creating a cause of
action in contract, (2) payment is demanded from the noncitizen, and (3) the
noncitizen fails to pay for the charges.37 The Board also stated that if the
noncitizen accepts government services, that “does not in and of itself make
the [noncitizen]38 a public charge.”39 In 1974, however, the Board narrowed
29. Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214. But note that prior to this
act, the government deported individuals for their poverty. See Ibrahim Hirsi, Trump Admin-
istration’s ‘Public Charge’ Provision Has Roots in Colonial US, WORLD (Dec. 19, 2018, 2:00
PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-12-19/trump-administration-s-public-charge-provision-
has-roots-colonial-us [https://perma.cc/JU86-N7NS].
30. Hirsi, supra note 29. Congress later passed a statute excluding “[a]ll idiots, insane
persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge.” Immigration Act of 1891, ch.
551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084.
31. 92 U.S. 259 (1876).
32. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., REP. ON GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF
ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 7–8 (Comm. Print 1988).
33. Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2 (noting that the Secretary of Treasury is tasked
with “provid[ing] . . . support and relief of such immigrants therein landing as may fall into
distress or need public aid”).
34. Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 899.
35. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 10 (1915) (finding that Russian noncitizens could not be
deported as public charges solely because the city they intended to enter had high unemploy-
ment rates).
36. See, e .g ., Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
37. B⸺, 3 I. & N. Dec. 323, 326 (B.I.A. 1948) (holding that an institutionalized nonciti-
zen had not become a public charge by being housed in a state hospital for no cost).
38. This Comment replaces the term “alien” with “noncitizen” when quoting U.S. im-
migration law to use language that affirms the dignity and humanity of such individuals.
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the scope of its three-part test, holding that its application would be limited
to the determination of whether a noncitizen had become a public charge
after admission to the United States.40
Subsequent regulations focused on cash assistance as the identifier for
public charges. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)41 prom-
ulgated a final rule in 1987 that classified individuals seeking adjustment of
status as public charges if they had received public cash assistance.42 The INS
explained that cash assistance would not include food stamps, public hous-
ing, or other noncash benefits.43 In response to the growth in the undocu-
mented immigrant population in the 1990s, Congress enacted the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 to amend
the INA.44 The amendment added factors to assess whether an individual is
classified as a public charge: age, health, family status, financial status, educa-
tion, skills, and affidavits of support.45 The amendment requires that those
immigrating through certain visas, including family and employment-based
petitions, provide an affidavit of support to avoid public charge status.46 A
noncitizen’s sponsor must demonstrate that they can support the noncitizen
at an annual income of at least 125 percent of the federal poverty level.47 This
affidavit is required even if the adjudicator would find that a noncitizen is
unlikely to become a public charge.48
In 1999, to clarify the meaning of “public charge,” the INS published a
Field Guidance establishing that the public charge determination is a “totali-
39. B⸺, 3 I. & N. Dec. at 324.
40. Harutunian, 14 I. & N. Dec. 583, 589 (B.I.A. 1974).
41. INS is the predecessor to three agencies: USCIS, Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY 11 (2012), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files
/USCIS/History%20and%20Genealogy/Our%20History/INS%20History/INSHistory.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LJ6U-H6PH].
42. Adjustment of Status for Certain Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,205, 16,211 (May 1, 1987)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 245a).
43. Id . at 16,209.
44. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, sec. 531, § 212(a), 110 Stat. 3009–546, –674 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)). By expanding inadmissibility and removal grounds, IIRIRA disrupted family unity
by removing members already in the U.S. and disincentivized the immigration of poor indi-
viduals. Donald Kerwin, From IIRIRA to Trump: Connecting the Dots to the Current US Immi-
gration Policy Crisis, 6 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 192, 198–99 (2018).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(B).
46. Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64
Fed. Reg. 28,689, 28,689 (Mar. 26, 1999). The affidavit of support is required for employment-
based immigrants who intend to work for a relative or for a company in which a U.S. citizen or
lawful permanent resident relative holds a 5 percent or more ownership interest. Id .
47. Id .; see HHS Poverty Guidelines for 2021, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (last
updated Jan. 15, 2021), https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/CD97-TRL7].
48. Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64
Fed. Reg. at 28,689.
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ty of the circumstances test.”49 In this memorandum, the agency clarified
that “ ‘public charge’ means [a noncitizen] . . . who is likely to become (for
admission/adjustment purposes) ‘primarily dependent on the government
for subsistence.’ ”50 A decade later, in the Foreign Affairs Manual,51 the State
Department further defined public charge as signifying dependence on the
U.S. government for either public cash assistance for income maintenance or
long-term institutionalization.52 Neither the use of noncash benefits nor the
use of some public benefits triggered public charge status.53
B. Final Public Charge Rule
The Trump Administration had an unprecedented focus on public
charge as a ground of inadmissibility. The Final Rule penalized noncitizens
for having a disability, as disabilities greatly cut against noncitizens in the
public charge determination. In 2019, approximately 21,000 individuals were
deemed inadmissible on the basis of public charge, over 22 times the mere
932 individuals deemed inadmissible in 2015.54 In January 2018, the State
Department amended the Foreign Affairs Manual with regard to the public
charge determination,55 signaling the content of the regulation to come. The
amendment allowed for noncash benefits to be considered as a factor in the
totality of the circumstances test at the time of visa application.56 The
49. Id . at 28,690.
50. Id . at 28,689 (emphasis added).
51. The Foreign Affairs Manual provides guidelines for consular officials abroad. See
Foreign Affairs Manual, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://fam.state.gov [https://perma.cc/2K2Z-
BAKE]. It can be amended without notice or comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1).
52. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 40.41 N2.a (2009),
https://immigration.com/sites/default/files/86988_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/28CE-WMMH].
53. Prior to 2019, the following programs were excluded from the public charge desig-
nation: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly called Food Stamps); Medicaid;
the Child Health Insurance Program; emergency medical services; the Women, Infants, &
Children program; energy assistance; Head Start; and job training programs. Id .
54. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., Table XX: Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visa Ineligi-
bilities (by Grounds for Refusal Under the Immigration and Nationality Act); Fiscal Year 2015,
U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports
/FY2015AnnualReport/FY15AnnualReport-TableXX.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RRS-QLSW];
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., Table XX: Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visa Ineligibilities (by
Grounds for Refusal Under the Immigration and Nationality Act); Fiscal Year 2019, U.S. DEP’T
STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2019Annual
Report/FY19AnnualReport-TableXX.pdf [https://perma.cc/NME3-WFKF].
55. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 302.8-2(B)(1) (2018),
https://fam.state.gov/FAM/09FAM/09FAM030208.html [https://web.archive.org/web/2018
0120232020/https://fam.state.gov/FAM/09FAM/09FAM030208.html].
56. Id . § 302.8-2(B)(1)(d). Under the amendment, “public benefits” in the public charge
context included Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families Supplemental Security Income, Housing Choice Voucher Program, Section 8
Project-Based Rental Assistance, most forms of federally funded Medicaid, and subsidized
public housing. 8 C.F.R. § 212.21(b) (2020).
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amendment further instructed officers to consider an applicant’s health:
“[C]ertain health issues which might affect employment, increase likelihood
of future medical expenses, or otherwise affect the applicant’s ability to ade-
quately provide for himself or herself or dependents should increase the
burden on the applicant to provide evidence that they will not become a
public charge.”57
Citing self-reliance as a “core principle” in the United States when dis-
cussing immigration, the Trump Administration proffered a drastic expan-
sion of the public charge definition.58 In its original iteration, the rule
designated a list of public benefits that would be considered in public charge
inadmissibility determinations and proposed different thresholds depending
on the public benefit.59 On October 10, 2018, DHS commenced the rulemak-
ing process by inviting comment on the proposed rule.60 Commenters ex-
pressed concerns ranging from the “backdoor” exclusion of immigrants with
HIV/AIDS61 to the discrimination against communities of color that dispro-
portionately experience chronic conditions like heart disease.62 After receiv-
ing over 266,000 public comments, DHS published the Final Rule, entitled
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, in the Federal Register in August
2019.63
The Final Rule was the most expansive iteration of the public charge rule
since its inception in 1882. It allowed DHS to deny permanent residence, or
green cards, from noncitizens who have used certain public benefits in the
past. As these benefits included food stamps and Medicaid, the public charge
redefinition excluded immigrants with disabilities who are food insecure or
need Medicaid for home- and community-based services. Food insecurity is
prominent in the United States, where over fifty million people experience
57. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 55, § 302.8-2(B)(2)(b)(2).
58. Press Briefing by USCIS Acting Director Ken Cuccinelli, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 12,
2019, 10:02 AM), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-
uscis-acting-director-ken-cuccinelli-081219 [https://perma.cc/SVG8-HBQV].
59. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,296 (Aug. 14,
2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 212–14, 245, 248). The rule originally proposed a
threshold based on the Federal Poverty Guidelines for monetizable public benefits, such as
cash benefits, and a duration threshold for receipt of non-monetizable benefits, like Medicare,
more than twelve months in a thirty-six-month period. Id .
60. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (proposed Oct. 10,
2018).
61. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,411.
62. Id . at 41,408. See also Garth Graham, Disparities in Cardiovascular Disease Risk in
the United States, 11 CURRENT CARDIOLOGY REVS. 238, 240 (2015).
63. Public Charge, supra note 12.
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uncertain access to food.64 More than seventy million individuals were en-
rolled in Medicaid as of November 2020.65
As in its original iteration, the Final Rule applied to applicants for lawful
permanent residence, applicants for immigrant and nonimmigrant visas,
and nonimmigrants seeking to extend their stay in the same nonimmigrant
visa category or change their status to that of a different nonimmigrant cate-
gory.66 Legal permanent residents who are absent from the United States for
a continuous period exceeding 180 days are also subject to inadmissibility
grounds and, consequently, were subject to the Final Rule.67 The Final Rule
did not change the public charge ground of deportability.68 With respect to
adjustment of status, the Final Rule required applicants subject to the public
charge ground of inadmissibility to file a Declaration of Self-Sufficiency with
their Form I-485 to prove that they were not likely to become a public
charge.69 Noncitizens seeking an extension of stay or change of status had to
demonstrate that they had not received public benefits over the threshold
since obtaining the status they wished to change.70
The Final Rule redefined a public charge to be a noncitizen “who re-
ceives one or more public benefit for more than 12 months in the aggregate
within any 36-month period.”71 In this formulation, the receipt of two public
benefits in one month qualified as two months of public benefits.72 The Final
Rule also redefined “public benefit” to include cash benefits for income
maintenance, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, most forms
64. Facts About Poverty and Hunger in America, FEEDING AM., https://www
.feedingamerica.org/hunger-in-america/facts [https://perma.cc/JWB4-YW2P].
65. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 2020
MEDICAID AND CHIP ENROLLMENT TRENDS SNAPSHOT 4 fig.1, https://www
.medicaid.gov/medicaid/national-medicaid-chip-program-information/downloads/october-
november-medicaid-chip-enrollment-trend-snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY5N-RUWY].
66. Public Charge, supra note 12.
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(ii); Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 41,326.
68. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,295. This ground trig-
gers deportation of noncitizens who have become a public charge within five years of their en-
try into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5).
69. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,295. The Declaration
of Self-Sufficiency, or Form I-944, asks applicants to report their credit scores, health insur-
ance, and history of receipt of public benefits. DECLARATION OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY, OMB NO.
1615-0142, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 7–8 (2019), https://www.uscis.gov/sites
/default/files/document/forms/i-944-pc.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6MR-93PM]. Following the
Biden Administration’s decision to not apply the Final Rule, USCIS ceased requiring submis-
sions of Form I-944. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds Final Rule: Litigation, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (last updated Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.uscis.gov/green-
card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/public-charge/inadmissibility-on-public-charge-
grounds-final-rule-litigation [https://perma.cc/TL7R-BQYL].
70. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,295.
71. Id . at 41,297.
72. Id . at 41,295.
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of Medicaid, Section 8 Housing Assistance under the Housing Choice
Voucher Program, Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance, and certain
other forms of subsidized housing.73
The Final Rule gave officers new guidelines regarding how to consider
the factors in the noncitizen’s case, discussing “heavily weighted” positive
and negative factors.74 Age, for instance, was a negative factor.75 A nonciti-
zen was more likely to be considered a public charge if they were under
eighteen or over sixty-one.76 Under the health factor, medical conditions
were considered with regard to whether the noncitizen “[would] be able to
care for himself or herself, to attend school, or to work . . . has sufficient
household assets and resources, including but not limited to private health
insurance, to cover any reasonably foreseeable medical costs.”77 A factor that
heavily cut against noncitizens was receipt of public benefits.78 These guide-
lines effectively prompted officers to equate “health” with “lack of disability.”
While some groups were statutorily exempted from the public charge inad-
missibility ground, the exemptions primarily covered survivors of violence
and persecution and special immigrant juveniles. 79
Following the Final Rule’s publication, several groups that provide ser-
vices to immigrants and states challenged the Final Rule as an impermissible
interpretation of the INA.80 Some of these suits included claims alleging dis-
crimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act.81 In late 2019, federal district court judges in several states
issued temporary injunctions to block the Final Rule from taking effect na-
tionwide.82 The Ninth and Fourth Circuits subsequently held that the Final
Rule qualified as a permissible interpretation of the statute,83 staying the in-





77. Id . at 41,412.
78. Id . at 41,298–99.
79. See 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(4)(E).
80. See, e .g ., Casa de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, 414 F. Supp. 3d 760, 785 (D. Md. 2019)
(finding that nonprofit plaintiff established an injury in fact on the basis of diversion of its re-
sources), rev’d, 971 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2020); Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408
F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1220 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (holding that there were serious questions regarding
whether DHS acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in formulating the rule).
81. E .g ., Washington, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1216.
82. Id .
83. City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 944 F.3d 773,
799 (9th Cir. 2019); Casa de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220, 230 (4th Cir. 2020).
84. E .g ., Casa de Maryland, No. 19-2222 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 2019) (order staying prelimi-
nary injunction).
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sued by the Southern District of New York remained in place,85 and the Sec-
ond Circuit declined to stay them pending appeal.86 On January 27, 2020, the
Supreme Court authorized the Trump Administration to enforce the Final
Rule while challenges on the merits proceed.87
DHS implemented the rule nationwide on February 24, 2020.88 In
alignment with the Final Rule, the Office of Management and Budget ap-
proved Form DS-5540, or Public Charge Questionnaire, to be filed by appli-
cants for admission.89 New York and other state and local governments
subsequently requested that the Supreme Court temporarily block the Final
Rule during the COVID-19 pandemic, but their plea was denied in late April
2020.90 The Final Rule continued to stop and start several times,91 causing
noncitizens confusion.92 The Supreme Court agreed to review the Final Rule
85. Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Cuccinelli, No. 19 Civ. 7993, 2019 WL 6498283 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
2, 2019) (denying motion to stay preliminary injunction); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Home-
land Sec., No. 19 Civ. 7777, 2019 WL 6498250 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2019) (same).
86. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-3591, 2020 WL 95815, at *1 (2d
Cir. Jan. 8, 2020).
87. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020). Additionally, a dis-
trict court in Illinois enjoined the Final Rule only within Illinois, and the Seventh Circuit,
without an opinion, declined to stay the injunction pending appeal. Cook Cnty. v. Wolf, No.
19-3169 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2019) (order denying motion to stay preliminary injunction). On
February 21, 2020, in a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court granted the application for stay pend-
ing disposition of the government’s appeal in the Seventh Circuit, thereby permitting enforce-
ment of the Final Rule in Illinois. Wolf v. Cook Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 681, 681 (2020). The Seventh
Circuit later held that the preliminary injunction was properly granted. Cook Cnty. v. Wolf,
962 F.3d 208, 215 (2020). In a thorough dissent, then Judge Amy Barrett recognized that many
noncitizens are forgoing public benefits because of the Final Rule but still concluded that it is a
reasonable interpretation of the INA. Id . at 234–54 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
88. DHS Implements Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds Final Rule, DEP’T
HOMELAND SEC. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/02/24/dhs-implements-
inadmissibility-public-charge-grounds-final-rule [https://perma.cc/6TRQ-WBJ4].
89. Notice of OMB Emergency Approval of Information Collection: Public Charge
Questionnaire, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,694, 13,695 (Mar. 9, 2020). Due to the policy change, however,
the State Department is not currently requiring applicants to complete the DS-5540. Update on
Public Charge, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Mar. 26, 2021), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel
/en/News/visas-news/update-on-public-charge.html [https://perma.cc/88ZJ-EZW7].
90. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 2709 (2020). The Second Cir-
cuit later modified two nationwide injunctions of the Final Rule (one of which directly ad-
dressed the pandemic) to limit their scope to Connecticut, New York, and Vermont. New York
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2020). This resulted in a nonuniform
application of immigration law where every state except those in the Second Circuit was sub-
ject to the new rule. A few months later, however, the Second Circuit stayed the injunction.
New York v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 974 F.3d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 2020).
91. For instance, an Illinois federal judge’s nationwide vacatur of the Final Rule lasted
only one day, as the Seventh Circuit subsequently allowed DHS to resume implementation
during the appeal. Cook Cnty. v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-06334, 2020 WL 6393005 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2,
2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-3150 (7th Cir. Nov. 3, 2020) (order staying the district court’s
judgment).
92. E .g ., SUSAN H. BABEY, JOELLE WOLSTEIN, RITI SHIMKHADA & NINEZ A. PONCE,
UCLA CTR. FOR HEALTH POL’Y RSCH., ONE IN 4 LOW-INCOME IMMIGRANT ADULTS IN
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a fourth time on February 22, 2021,93 until the Biden Administration later
informed the Court it would no longer defend the Final Rule.94
C. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
In 1973, Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act in response to findings
that individuals with disabilities faced discrimination in numerous areas.95
Indeed, in introducing a nondiscrimination bill, Rep. Charles Vanik de-
scribed the treatment of people with disabilities as one of the “shameful
oversights” of the United States.96 With the Rehabilitation Act, Congress
aimed to improve the ability of individuals with disabilities to live with
greater independence and self-sufficiency, targeting the expansion of ser-
vices, employment opportunities, and accessibility.97
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act has been referred to as an “accident
of history” because of the Nixon Administration’s resistance to its passage
and to subsequent regulations.98 After opposition stalled the effort to expand
the protected grounds of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include disability,99
section 504 borrowed language from the Civil Rights Act to ensure inclusion
of government entities.100 It prohibits the federal government from discrimi-
nation, such as the denial of benefits solely by reason of an individual’s disa-
bility.101 Government action includes “any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance,” such as programs at state prisons or public uni-
versities.102 Programs and facilities conducted by any federal executive agen-
cy must be accessible to people with disabilities,103 and the agency must
provide reasonable accommodations if they are not.104
CALIFORNIA AVOIDED PUBLIC PROGRAMS, LIKELY WORSENING FOOD INSECURITY AND ACCESS
TO HEALTH CARE (2021), https://healthpolicy.ucla.edu/publications/Documents/PDF/2021
/publiccharge-policybrief-mar2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/QEM9-BA8Q].
93. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, No. 20-449, 2021 WL 666376 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 2021). President Biden also signed an executive order directing a review of the Final
Rule. Exec. Order No. 14012, 86 Fed. Reg. 8277, 8278 (Feb. 5, 2021).
94. Joint Stipulation to Dismiss, supra note 15.
95. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2, 87 Stat. 355, 357 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701).
96. 117 CONG. REC. 45,974–75 (1971).
97. Rehabilitation Act § 2 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701).
98. RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN
THE WORKPLACE 5 (2001). Nixon vetoed the bill twice. Id . at 121.
99. Id . at 132–33.
100. JOSEPH SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 64–70 (1993).
101. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codi-
fied as amended 29 U.S.C. § 794).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
103. Id .
104. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2020).
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Section 504 reaches government action that discriminates through either
purpose or effect.105 Recipients of federal funding may not use criteria that
have a discriminatory effect on the basis of disability or, through purpose or
effect, substantially impair the “objectives of the recipient’s program.”106
Discrimination also includes the failure to reasonably accommodate, such as
not providing access to public assistance programs107 or necessary auxiliary
aids and services.108 As demonstrated in Part II, the Final Rule clearly vio-
lates section 504 because it discriminates against immigrants with disabilities
in both purpose and effect.
II. THE PUBLIC CHARGE RULE THROUGH A DISABILITY RIGHTS LENS
The Final Rule violated the Rehabilitation Act. Public charge determina-
tions by DHS are programs or activities within the scope of section 504. Un-
der the Final Rule, these determinations required an assessment of whether a
medical condition interferes with the noncitizen’s ability to care for them-
selves as part of the health factor.109 The Final Rule also instructed immigra-
tion officers to weigh certain factors in favor of or against finding someone
to be a public charge.110 These criteria, through purpose or effect, discrimi-
nated on the basis of disability, substantially impairing the objectives of pub-
lic benefit programs. The use of noncash public benefits, which immigrants
with disabilities disparately use,111 cut against noncitizens with disabilities.112
DHS ultimately “[t]riple-[c]ount[ed]” the same circumstances against each
noncitizen with a disability in violation of section 504: a noncitizen’s medical
condition and use of Medicaid cut against the noncitizen, and the noncitizen
was deprived of the favorable factor of a lack of a medical condition.113
DHS conceded that the Final Rule would have an “outsized” impact on
immigrants with disabilities because disability was considered as part of the
105. See id . § 41.51(b)(3)(ii). Referencing the “thoughtlessness and indifference” of dis-
crimination against those with disabilities, the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that
section 504 recognizes some claims of disparate impact discrimination. Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287, 295, 309 (1985).
106. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(3).
107. See Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 265 (2d Cir. 2003).
108. Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 2013).
109. 8 C.F.R. § 212.22(b)(2) (2020); see also Weber, supra note 13, at 266–68.
110. 8 C.F.R. § 212.22(c).
111. See Rebecca Cokley & Hannah Leibson, Trump’s Public-Charge Rule Would Threat-
en Disabled Immigrants’ Health and Safety, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 8, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/disability/news/2018/08/08/454537/trumps-public-
charge-rule-threaten-disabled-immigrants-health-safety [https://perma.cc/7VFZ-63VT].
112. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.22(b)(4)(E).
113. Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction at 10–16, Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191
(E.D. Wash. 2019) (No. 19-cv-05210) [hereinafter Brief for ACLU].
May 2021] Public Charge as Disability Discrimination 1627
health factor in admissibility determinations.114 A close examination of the
Final Rule and disability rights doctrine is necessary to contextualize this
“outsized” impact. This Part presents disability law theories as a framework
through which to scrutinize the Final Rule, revealing a substantial overlap
between immigration and disability law. Section II.A evaluates the Final Rule
under the access/content distinction and finds that individuals with disabili-
ties were denied access to the public benefits to which they were entitled.
Section II.B discusses eugenics-based legislation as it relates to exclusionary
immigration policies, concluding that the Final Rule codified modern-day
eugenics. Section II.C reconciles the gap between the self-sufficiency objec-
tives of the disability rights and immigrant communities and the role of so-
cial welfare. Finally, Section II.D assesses the public health consequences of
the Final Rule.
A. Considering the Access/Content Distinction
In Alexander v . Choate, the Supreme Court applied a “meaningful ac-
cess” standard to a Rehabilitation Act claim for the first time.115 If a plaintiff
has access to the same benefits received by nondisabled individuals, they are
seen as being provided with meaningful access—sometimes even if the bene-
fit disproportionately underserves people with disabilities.116 In the public
charge context, people with disabilities have a right to meaningful access to
the following benefits: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families Supplemental Security Income, Housing
Choice Voucher Program, Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance, most
forms of federally funded Medicaid, and subsidized public housing.117 The
Final Rule presented disability-related obstacles to the access of these public
benefits. Even when considering the “access/content distinction,” the Final
Rule not only failed to provide people with the content of the public benefits;
it also denied them access.
In disability discrimination cases, courts sometimes make an ac-
cess/content distinction, a phenomenon named by Professor Samuel Ba-
genstos, reasoning that the ADA only mandates access to a benefit, even if
the content of the benefit is not equal.118 To evaluate access, courts look at
the benefit: the more narrowly a court defines the benefit, the more likely a
court is to find that the plaintiff had access to it.119 In doing so, a court steers
itself away from regulating the content of the benefit to the detriment of
114. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,368 (Aug. 14,
2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 212–14, 245, 248).
115. 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985).
116. See infra notes 121–122 and accompanying text.
117. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.21(b).
118. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 70–71 (2009).
119. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 45 (2004).
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plaintiffs with disabilities.120 Choate illustrates the access/content distinction.
In Choate, Medicaid recipients brought a class action for relief against Ten-
nessee’s reduction of the number of inpatient hospital days covered by state
Medicaid from twenty to fourteen, alleging a violation of the Rehabilitation
Act.121 The plaintiffs argued that this reduction—and any reduction—
disparately impacted individuals with disabilities, because their needs would
not be met to the same degree as their nondisabled counterparts.122
The Choate majority drew a distinction between access to and the con-
tent of a benefit, narrowly defining meaningful access to mean “fourteen
days of inpatient hospitalization”123 as opposed to “healthcare that meets
needs at a reasonable cost.” Because the Medicaid recipients had “access” to
inpatient hospitalization—even if at a reduced rate that disparately impacted
their health needs—the Court found no cause of action and thus no need for
a reasonable accommodation.124 As noted by Professor Bagenstos, this dis-
tinction inhibits the effectiveness of disability rights legislation because it up-
holds a policy that inadequately serves the needs of people with disabilities.125
While some courts interpret meaningful access to require mere access to
services already offered,126 other courts exact higher standards by reframing
the generality of the benefit to which meaningful access must be granted. In
Lovell v . Chandler, the court held that Hawaiʻi’s exclusion of certain people
with disabilities from a healthcare program violated Title II of the ADA and
section 504.127 The court defined the benefit at a high level of generality as
public healthcare services, rejecting the state’s argument that it needed to of-
fer only the programs it already offered, even if the programs disparately ex-
cluded people with disabilities.128
Under the Final Rule, then, were individuals with disabilities denied
meaningful access to the enumerated public benefits? Regardless of the gen-
erality employed, the answer is unquestionably yes. Even under Choate’s
120. See id . at 45–48.
121. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289–90 (1985) (upholding the fourteen-day an-
nual limit on inpatient hospital stays imposed by Tennessee’s Medicaid plan).
122. Id . at 290.
123. BAGENSTOS, supra note 118, at 47–48; see id . at 303.
124. Choate, 469 U.S. at 302 (“The reduction in inpatient coverage will leave both handi-
capped and nonhandicapped Medicaid users with identical and effective hospital services fully
available for their use, with both classes of users subject to the same durational limitation.”).
125. BAGENSTOS, supra note 118, at 71 (quoting Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d
557, 560 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.) (“A camera store may not refuse to sell cameras to a disa-
bled person, but it is not required to stock cameras specifically designed for such persons.”)).
126. E .g ., Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d. 557, 563 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding
health insurance policies that capped AIDS coverage to $25,000–100,000 whereas other condi-
tions were covered at $1,000,000).
127. 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Title II expands section 504’s prohibition of
discrimination to the services, programs, and activities of all federally funded programs regard-
less of whether they are public entities. Id .
128. See Chandler, 303 F.3d at 1053–54.
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skeletal definition of access, the Final Rule denied immigrants with disabili-
ties meaningful access to healthcare, energy assistance, nutrition security,
and other benefits. There are not two levels of generality here. The benefit is
the ability to apply for and receive public benefits while not inhibiting other
rights, such as the right to become a U.S. citizen or simply stay in the United
States on a legal permanent basis. Because the Final Rule forced immigrants
with disabilities to put their immigration status at risk to receive public
benefits, it denied them meaningful access to the benefits. While it may be
argued that immigrants with disabilities were able to do this under the Final
Rule, that was not the case. For example, if a noncitizen with a disability used
Medicaid to cover treatment for their condition, they were likely to be desig-
nated a public charge and unable to become a legal permanent resident and
naturalize.129 This noncitizen ultimately had to choose between their health
and their capacity to live in the United States at a heightened economic
cost.130 In effect, this was not a choice at all. Thus, a formulation of the bene-
fit at a lower level of generality (ability to apply for and receive public bene-
fits with the preservation of U.S. residency) and higher level of generality
(ability to apply for and receive public benefits) would be a false bifurcation.
The benefits cannot be separated from the repercussions.
The policy in Choate affected all people with disabilities who sought
hospital care beyond fourteen days,131 whereas the policy in Chandler ex-
cluded older and blind people from a state healthcare program.132 Here, the
Final Rule affected the noncitizen subsection of people with disabilities. Be-
cause the Final Rule effectively eliminated the only programs that permitted
noncitizens with disabilities to live and work in the United States, the Final
Rule is more akin to the policy at issue in Chandler. The Final Rule left a cer-
tain category of people with disabilities with no access to public benefits be-
cause it precluded the use of discrete programs like Low-Income Home
Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) that meet the unique needs of immi-
grants with disabilities.133 But for their disability, noncitizens with disabilities
would have received public benefits without consequence, similar to the
plaintiffs in Chandler.134
There can be no meaningful access where a regulation forces noncitizens
to forego the public benefits that they and their families need to survive. Pri-
vate insurance companies exclude coverage of services that people with disa-
129. See Cokley & Leibson, supra note 111.
130. See infra Section II.D.
131. 469 U.S. 287, 289 (1985).
132. 303 F.3d at 1045.
133. Cokley & Leibson, supra note 111. Seventy-two percent of households that receive
LIHEAP have an individual with a serious medical condition. Id .
134. Chandler, 303 F.3d. at 1054 (“[Plaintiffs] qualified financially for the QUEST pro-
gram but were excluded because they were disabled . . . .”).
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bilities often need135 or impose caps on reimbursement for certain condi-
tions,136 resulting in a heightened need for access to Medicaid. Individuals
who require electricity to support medical equipment need energy assistance
that programs like the LIHEAP provide.137 The Final Rule, however, disin-
centivized participation in public benefits, rendering moot the ability to even
receive them. For some, it was much more than a disincentive—it was a life-
or-death decision where an immigrant had to choose between remaining in
the United States without essential public benefits or being forced to relocate
to a country where they may not have access to adequate healthcare.138 In
tension with congressional intent to empower those with disabilities, the Fi-
nal Rule blatantly violated section 504.
B. Eugenics and Law
Disability scholarship uses two models of disability: the medical model
and the social model.139 The latter, which is preferred by disability scholars,
presents disability as not inherent to the individual.140 This model focuses on
the interaction between an individual and their environment and social
structures.141 Environments, as the product of social choices of others, are
subject to modification.142 For example, an individual who uses a wheelchair
is hindered if there is no wheelchair ramp in a building—her disability is not
inherent in her but is instead the consequence of the municipality’s choice
not to include a ramp. Disability itself is thus not the debilitating characteris-
tic. In contrast, under the medical model, the focus is on the medical condi-
tion, framing disability as a negative impairment that is inextricable from the
135. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, MEDICAID WORKS FOR PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES (2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-29-17health.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3EVC-YUGH] (“Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities are less likely to
report unmet medical needs than people with other sources of coverage.”); see also, e .g ., Tem-
plet v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of La., No. Civ. A. 99-1400, 2000 WL 1568219, at *1 (E.D. La.
Oct. 20, 2000) (barring coverage for urgent medical care for obesity).
136. E .g ., Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 1999).
137. Cokley & Leibson, supra note 111.
138. For example, experts predicted that up to 129,000 Massachusetts residents would
avoid the health system in fear of the public charge designation. Steph Solis, Up to 129,000
Immigrants in Massachusetts Could Shy Away from MassHealth over Fear of Public Charge
Rule, Report Suggests, MASSLIVE (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.masslive.com/politics/2020
/09/up-to-129000-immigrants-in-massachusetts-could-shy-away-from-masshealth-over-fear-
of-public-charge-rule-report-suggests.html [https://perma.cc/VHN9-4QJQ].
139. Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 214 (2000); see also Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social
Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1256 (2007) (noting the limitations of the social
model regarding policy implications).
140. Samaha, supra note 139, at 1257.
141. Id .
142. See id . at 1257–58.
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individual.143 Three practices arise from the medical model: eugenics, cures,
and charity.144 This Section focuses on the practice of eugenics as it intersects
with exclusionary policies, particularly in immigration law.
In the past, U.S. laws have endorsed eugenics. Francis Galton, a Europe-
an scientist who coined the term “eugenics” in 1883, defined it as the “sci-
ence of improving stock, which . . . takes cognisance of all influences that
tend in however remote a degree to give to the more suitable races or strains
of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable than they
otherwise would have had.”145 In the early twentieth century, eugenics theory
proliferated in the United States, popularizing the belief that the ills of socie-
ty could be cured by eliminating the reproduction of those with undesirable
social, moral, physical, and mental qualities.146 The eugenics movement re-
sulted in laws that criminalized marriage and sexual relations of those who
were “epileptic, imbecile, or feebleminded” or in interracial relationships.147
Eugenicists applied the same underlying beliefs about “improving stock”
to advocate for exclusionary immigration policies.148 Specifically, they sup-
ported the enactment of the Federal Immigration Restriction Act of 1924,
lauding its prevention of the “rising tide of defective germ-plasm” carried by
immigrants.149 This law imposed strict quotas in which only two percent of
the number of people of each nationality present in the United States as of
1890 were permitted to immigrate.150 Regarding this 1924 law, President
Coolidge pronounced, “America must be kept American [because] biological
143. See CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT: LEGISLATIVE
ROOTS 12 (1988).
144. See SHAPIRO, supra note 100, at 14–15, 271. In all three practices, the onus is not on
society to become more accessible but instead is on the individual to not have a disability any-
more. Medical cures are presented as the “solution” to disability where disability is a condition
that must be eliminated through medicine. With charity, the notion is that if people donate
money, the disability is more likely to be rid from society; this relies on viewing individuals
with disabilities as dependent or pitiful.
145. FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 24–25
(London, Macmillan 1883).
146. Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Steri-
lization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 3–4 (1996).
147. MARK A. LARGENT, BREEDING CONTEMPT: THE HISTORY OF COERCED
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 64–65 (2008).
148. JUDITH DAAR, THE NEW EUGENICS: SELECTIVE BREEDING IN AN ERA OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 35 (2017).
149. Id . Daar also noted that “[e]very president from Theodore Roosevelt to Herbert
Hoover was a member of a eugenics organization, publicly endorsed eugenic laws, or willingly
signed eugenic legislation.” Id . at 36.
150. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159 (repealed 1952). This facili-
tated the Americanization of a white race and rendered non-European immigrants “unaltera-
bly foreign and unassimilable to the nation.” Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of Race in
American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. AM. HIST.
67, 70 (1999).
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laws show . . . that Nordics deteriorate when mixed with other races.”151 The
Supreme Court further legitimized eugenics when it upheld Virginia’s steri-
lization law in Buck v . Bell, which mandated the sterilization of an institu-
tionalized, “feeble-minded” eighteen-year-old girl.152 Eugenics is rooted in
the medical model of disability, as it treats disability as a biological impair-
ment to the person that is so undesirable that the person’s genes must be re-
moved from society.
The Final Rule is modern-day eugenics. DHS rooted its justifications for
the Final Rule in the medical model of disability, framing disability as a con-
dition inherent to an individual that must be ferreted out of society. The cas-
es to which the government cited in support of the Final Rule point to a
eugenics-centered metric of eligibility to stay on a permanent basis or be-
come part of the U.S. citizenry. In the preamble to the Final Rule, DHS ex-
plained its expansion of the definition of “public benefits” notwithstanding
its effect on immigrants with disabilities, reasoning that health has historical-
ly been part of the public charge inquiry.153 In support of this proposition,
the government cited to United States ex rel . Canfora v . Williams, in which
an Italian man, Vincenzo Canfora, developed gangrene in his foot that re-
sulted in its eventual amputation.154 After Canfora returned to the United
States from Italy where he was visiting his mother, immigration authorities
detained him on the grounds that he was likely to become a public charge.155
The United States brought a writ of habeas corpus on his behalf challenging
his detainment.156 An immigration officer had received a letter indicating
that Canfora had not paid for the surgery—nor had he been asked to.157 Can-
fora also had relatives who were willing and able to maintain him financial-
ly.158 Due to the immigration officer’s finding that Canfora was likely to
become a public charge on the basis of his being an amputee, the court dis-
151. DAAR, supra note 148, at 36 (alteration in original).
152. 274 U.S. 200, 205–07 (1927) (declaring that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are
enough”). Although many states have since repealed their sterilization laws, Buck v . Bell has
never been overruled. In Roe v . Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), in fact, the Supreme Court
cited the case. See generally ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, AMERICAN
EUGENICS, AND THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK (2017); Jasmine E. Harris, Why Buck v.
Bell Still Matters, BILL HEALTH (Oct. 14, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu
/2020/10/14/why-buck-v-bell-still-matters [https://perma.cc/LQG8-ZJ5S] (“Buck’s lasting
power lies not in its doctrinal deployment, but in its expressive value and how it continues to
shape public norms and legal interpretations about the humanity and dignity of Black, Latinx,
indigenous, and disabled bodies and minds.”).
153. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,368–69 (Aug. 14,
2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 212–14, 245, 248).
154. 186 F. 354, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); see Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84
Fed. Reg. 41,2922 at 41,368 n.407.
155. Canfora, 186 F. at 355.
156. Id .
157. See id . at 355–56.
158. Id . at 355.
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missed the writ of habeas corpus.159 DHS also cited to cases in which “dan-
gerous” disease and poverty are referenced,160 a nondisabled noncitizen is
positively regarded for her lack of mental or physical disability,161 and
noncitizens are excluded for having a “rudimentary right hand” and for
“stammer[ing] to such an extent that [they] can scarcely make [themselves]
understood.”162 DHS’s citations unequivocally evoke eugenics theory.
Statements by former President Donald Trump and former Acting Di-
rector Cuccinelli further demonstrate an underlying belief that individuals
from other countries are genetically “less than” Americans—the same myth
that underpinned the 1924 Immigration Act’s restrictive quotas. In response
to Democratic support for healthcare for undocumented immigrants,
Trump tweeted, “How about taking care of American Citizens first!? That’s
the end of that race!”163 He often refers to Latinx164 immigrants as disease-
bringers,165 which stands in sharp contrast to his description of his family as
159. Id . at 356.
160. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,368 n.407 (Aug.
14, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 212–14, 245, 248); Ex parte Mitchell, 256 F. 229,
232 (N.D.N.Y. 1919) (describing “persons certified by the examining surgeon to have a mental
or physical defect of a nature to affect their ability to earn a living” as a characteristic of a pub-
lic charge).
161. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,368 n.407; Ex parte
Sakaguchi, 277 F. 913, 916 (9th Cir. 1922) (emphasizing that “any” evidence of mental or phys-
ical disability would automatically qualify the appellant as a public charge).
162. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,368 n.407; United
States ex rel . Barlin v. Rodgers, 191 F. 970, 974–75 (3d Cir. 1911) (noting that it was “clearly
within the power of the board to take the finding of the physical defect into consideration with
the examination . . . on the ground that the respondent was likely to become a public charge”).
163. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 27, 2019, 9:37 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1144419410729242625 [https://perma.cc/UKF5-
QXDL] (“All Democrats just raised their hands for giving millions of illegal aliens unlimited
healthcare. How about taking care of American Citizens first!? That’s the end of that race!”).
164. This Comment uses “Latinx” when referring to people of Latin American heritage in
an attempt to use gender-neutral language, as “Latino” and “Latina” are gendered. See John
Paul Brammer, Digging into the Messy History of “Latinx” Helped Me Embrace My Complex
Identity, MOTHER JONES (May–June 2019) https://www.motherjones.com/media/2019/06
/digging-into-the-messy-history-of-latinx-helped-me-embrace-my-complex-identity
[https://perma.cc/JL8W-HTG2]. It should be noted, however, that there is disagreement in the
Latinx community over the use of this term for its linguistic imperialism and difficulty to pro-
nounce in Spanish. Jose A. Del Real, ‘Latinx’ Hasn’t Even Caught on Among Latinos . It Never
Will ., WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2020, 10:31 AM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook
/latinx-latinos-unpopular-gender-term/2020/12/18/bf177c5c-3b41-11eb-9276-ae0ca72729be
_story.html [https://perma.cc/X8G4-FWBT].
165. E .g ., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 11, 2018, 7:12 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1072464107784323072 [https://perma.cc/7M6B-
47L6] (“They want Open Borders for anyone to come in. This brings large scale crime and dis-
ease.”). President Trump had also previously stated that “tremendous infectious disease is
pouring across the border.” Rupert Neate & Jo Tuckman, Donald Trump: Mexican Migrants
Bring ‘Tremendous Infectious Disease’ to US, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2015, 6:29 PM), https://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/06/donald-trump-mexican-immigrants-tremendous-
infectious-disease [https://perma.cc/54TY-6CA9].
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having “[g]ood, smart genes.”166 At a White House briefing, Cuccinelli stated
that the immigration system “bring[s] people to join us as American citizens,
as legal permanent residents first, who can stand on their own two feet, who
will not be reliant on the welfare system.”167
Moreover, the public charge exclusion of individuals with disabilities
disparately affected other marginalized communities. Some commenters on
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking noted that “the rule sends the signal that
individuals with HIV/AIDS and other chronic health conditions are ‘unde-
sirable.’ ”168 Because some medical conditions disproportionately affect
communities of color, the Final Rule also disfavored immigrants of color.169
The Final Rule served as a gatekeeping mechanism to ensure that only non-
disabled immigrants are admitted and remain in the United States.
C. On Social Welfare and Disability
With the explicit preference for noncitizens who can “stand on their
own two feet” to the exclusion of noncitizens who are “unable” to care for
themselves,170 the Trump Administration painted a dichotomy between self-
sufficiency and disability. Evidence suggests, however, that the use of bene-
fits actually promotes self-sufficiency.171 Moreover, the immigrant and disa-
bility communities value independence and employment. The Trump
Administration’s basis for the Final Rule was thus flawed.
The disability rights community values independence.172 Since the Civil
War, social welfare has been one of the central tenets of disability law in the
United States.173 Some disability rights advocates, however, rejected welfare
as the legislative response to disability issues, preferring prohibition on dis-
crimination and allowance of accommodations in its stead.174 This is because
social welfare as a response to disability relies on the paternalistic medical
model.175 In the 1970s, this rejection culminated in a legislative shift from
welfare to civil rights, resulting in the Rehabilitation Act and, eventually, the
166. Ryan Teague Beckwith, Donald Trump Loves to Talk About His ‘Good Genes,’ TIME
(Sept. 12, 2017, 11:39 AM), https://time.com/4936612/donald-trump-genes-genetics [https://
perma.cc/K5A7-YJEDG] (quoting President Trump’s reference to his granddaughter’s “[g]ood,
smart genes”).
167. Press Briefing by USCIS Acting Director Ken Cuccinelli, supra note 58.
168. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,411 (Aug. 14,
2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 212–14, 245, 248).
169. E .g ., Graham, supra note 62.
170. Press Briefing by USCIS Acting Director Ken Cuccinelli, supra note 58.
171. See infra notes 192–195 and accompanying text.
172. See, e .g ., Florence D. DiGennaro Reed, Michael C. Strouse, Sarah R. Jenkins, Jamie
Price, Amy J. Henley & Jason M. Hirst, Barriers to Independent Living for Individuals with Dis-
abilities and Seniors, 7 BEHAV. ANALYSIS PRAC. 70, 71 (2014).
173. Bagenstos, supra note 119, at 10.
174. Id . at 11–12.
175. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).176 The Rehabilitation Act and ADA
prohibited discrimination on the basis of disability in programs that receive
federal funding and in employment, public accommodations, and public en-
tities’ programs, respectively.177 The welfare state largely remains in place,178
now alongside an antidiscrimination regime.179 Disability rights advocates
have recently refocused on the social welfare approach, recognizing the
strengths of benefits like Medicaid.180
The immigrant community esteems hard work. Latinx immigrants self-
identify as a working people181 and tend to believe that hard work yields pos-
itive results.182 The children of immigrants carry a “heavy burden of what
they perceive[] as their parents’ sacrifices” that creates a sense of obligation
to succeed.183 But public perceptions of immigrants’ relationship with hard
work can be distorted. Legislators, media, and lawyers perpetuate a “good
immigrant” narrative, often in support of policies like Deferred Action for
Child Arrivals. In this narrative, a noncitizen is deemed worthy of immigra-
tion relief for their stellar pursuit of higher education,184 faultlessness in en-
176. See Bagenstos, supra note 119, at 10.
177. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 391–93 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
§§ 102, 202, 302, 104 Stat. 327, 331–32, 337, 355 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a),
12132, 12182(a)).
178. Recently, there has been a troubling increase in work requirements imposed on
seekers of public assistance. See, e .g ., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFF. OF THE
PRESIDENT, EXPANDING WORK REQUIREMENTS IN NON-CASH WELFARE PROGRAMS (2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Work-Requirements-
in-Non-Cash-Welfare-Programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW4D-77MQ]. The rationale underly-
ing work requirements, however, is a false belief that public benefits lead to a lack of self-
sufficiency. HEATHER HAHN, URB. INST., WORK REQUIREMENTS IN SAFETY NET PROGRAMS
(2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98086/work_requirements_in
_safety_net_programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWX4-9KFC] (“Work requirements don’t neces-
sarily help people find jobs, and certainly not jobs that lift people out of poverty.”).
179. Bagenstos, supra note 119, at 10. This antidiscrimination model has also been sub-
ject to criticism for its ineffectiveness against structural barriers, as it focuses on the conduct of
specific actors. Id . at 23; cf . Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1845–46 (2005).
180. See Bagenstos, supra note 119, at 55–57.
181. Ashley-Marie Vollmer Hanna & Debora Marie Ortega, Salir adelante (Perseverance):
Lessons from the Mexican Immigrant Experience, 16 J. SOC. WORK 47, 54 (2016).
182. Paul Taylor, Mark Hugo Lopez, Jessica Martínez & Gabriel Velasco, The American
Experience, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 4, 2012), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2012/04/04
/iii-the-american-experience [https://perma.cc/RDF5-T8BY].
183. Cristina Araujo Brinkerhoff, C. Eduardo Siqueira, Rosalyn Negrón, Natalicia Tracy,
Magalis Troncoso Lama & Linda Sprague Martinez, ‘There You Enjoy Life, Here You Work’:
Brazilian and Dominican Immigrants’ Views on Work and Health in the U .S ., 16 INT’L J. ENV’T
RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH, no. 20, 2019, at 1, 11, https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16204025.
184. See Nina Totenberg, The Harvard Law Student and DREAMer Whose Fate Could Be
Decided by Supreme Court, NPR (Nov. 11, 2019, 5:50 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/11
/777397365/the-harvard-law-student-and-dreamer-whose-fate-could-be-decided-by-supreme-
court [https://perma.cc/9HR2-UKZ6].
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try into the country,185 assimilation,186 English proficiency,187 and gainful
employment without the need for welfare.188 These “good” immigrants are
valued over and at the expense of the “bad” ones—those who have criminal
records or are public charges.189 In 1996, for instance, Congress enacted the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which
limited immigrants’ access to welfare, food stamps, and health insurance.190
This legislation was driven by the belief that immigrants came to the United
States for welfare, despite the community’s high participation in the work-
force.191
The Final Rule thus raised questions about the role of social welfare for
communities that strive to be independent in the face of paternalizing or
condemning paradigms. Both the disability rights and immigrant communi-
ties rejected the Final Rule as a health-and-wealth tax,192 marking the im-
portance of social welfare for their communities. Social welfare programs,
although not faultless, are necessary for the independence of people with
disabilities.193 Medicaid enables people with disabilities to access employ-
ment through its coverage of home-based services and employment sup-
ports, without which they would not be in the workforce.194 Immigrant
rights activists, too, recognize the coexistence of welfare and employment,
185. See, e .g ., Editorial, Dream Big . Legalize Those in DACA, SUN SENTINEL (May 25,
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/editorials/fl-op-editorial-legalize-
daca-immigrants-20180524-story.html [https://perma.cc/34VN-A8PP] (“Their parents
brought them here as children. They must have been younger than 16 when they arrived.”).
186. See Joel Rose, In ‘The Good Immigrant,’ New Americans Grapple with Their Polar-
ized Country, NPR (Feb. 27, 2019, 12:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/27/698066947/in-
the-good-immigrant-new-americans-grapple-with-their-polarized-country
[https://perma.cc/QU3Q-Z68K].
187. See id .
188. Press Briefing by USCIS Acting Director Ken Cuccinelli, supra note 58. Cuccinelli re-
counted the story of his Italian grandfather’s immigration to the United States, underscoring
that his family “worked together to ensure that they could provide for their own needs, and
they never expected the government to do it for them.” Id .
189. See generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013
BYU L. REV. 1457 (2014).
190. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
191. IMMIGRANTS AND WELFARE: THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM ON AMERICA’S
NEWCOMERS 1–2 (Michael E. Fix ed., 2009).
192. “Health and wealth” tax refers to the Final Rule’s preference for nondisabled indi-
viduals who do not need public benefits.
193. See, e .g ., Manasi Deshpande, Tal Gross & Yalun Su, Disability and Distress: The Ef-
fect of Disability Programs on Financial Outcomes (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 25642, 2019), https://doi.org/10.3386/w25642 (finding that Social Security programs re-
duce financial distress and increase the likelihood of purchasing a home for people with disa-
bilities); see also MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN
CITY 161 (2016) (“[H]er $754 monthly check was more reliable than any job she could get.”).
194. Brief for ACLU, supra note 113, at *12–14.
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finding that immigrants who benefit from social welfare positively contrib-
ute to the U.S. economy.195
D. Public Health Implications
Granting a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of the Final
Rule, a federal judge explained that the decision “reflect[ed] no view whatso-
ever of whether the Final Rule is consistent or inconsistent with the Ameri-
can Dream,” maintaining that policy implications did not affect his
considerations.196 But to fully understand the Final Rule, it is essential to un-
derstand one of the several policy concerns it raised: public health implica-
tions.
The Final Rule threatened worse health outcomes and wider disease
spread in the United States. By deterring immigrants from using publicly
funded healthcare, including programs that cover services that private insur-
ance does not cover, the Final Rule increased the likelihood that immigrants
would suffer adverse health consequences. In turn, this affected U.S. public
health as a whole, especially with regard to communicable diseases.
The necessity of public benefits is greatly magnified during a public
health crisis.197 Yet, in response to several comments on the proposed rule
regarding communicable diseases, DHS stated that noncitizens who enrolled
in Medicaid for the purpose of obtaining a vaccine would nonetheless be
deemed public charges.198 Months later, in January 2020, the United States
confirmed its first case of COVID-19.199 During the pandemic, USCIS pub-
lished a message stating that seeking “treatment or preventative services [for
COVID-19] will not negatively affect any [noncitizen] as part of a future
Public Charge analysis.”200 But this message did not eliminate the Final
Rule’s chilling effect,201 and despite high COVID treatment costs202 and the
195. Annalisa Merelli, Immigrants Who Rely on Public Benefits Are Actually Essential to
the US Economy, QUARTZ (Jan. 30, 2020), https://qz.com/1790918/immigrants-who-use-
public-benefits-are-essential-to-us-economy [https://perma.cc/V2RL-VCLW].
196. Cook Cnty. v. McAleenan, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1031 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
197. See Michelle Hackman, Rule Barring Immigrants from Social Programs Risks Wors-
ening Coronavirus Spread, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/rule-barring-immigrants-from-social-programs-risks-worsening-coronavirus-spread-
11585137602 [https://perma.cc/59W7-MM92].
198. E .g ., Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,384–85
(Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 212–14, 245, 248).
199. Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/2RUW
-NMUB].
200. Public Charge, supra note 12.
201. Estimates showed that millions of immigrants would forego Medicaid to escape the
public charge determination, and most of these are Latinx or Asian. Leighton Ku, New Evi-
dence Demonstrates that the Public Charge Rule Will Harm Immigrant Families and Others,
HEALTHAFFAIRS (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191008
.70483/full [https://perma.cc/G9ZL-G75J]. Confusion over the scope of the public charge rule
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fact that the Final Rule is no longer in place, immigrants still fear the grave
consequences of seeking subsidized healthcare.203 In particular, avoidance of
public benefits likely remains high among Latinx noncitizens and those who
do not speak English well.204 Furthermore, treatment and testing are only
small subsections of the public benefits that noncitizens may need in the
midst of a pandemic-caused economic downturn, and notably, USCIS did
not provide an exemption for the use of other benefits.205
CONCLUSION
The Final Rule may be defunct for now, but its resilience raises concerns
of its eventual return. The Final Rule discriminated against immigrants with
disabilities in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act with broad
social and legal implications. The Final Rule further formalized the idea that
disability is an undesired characteristic for U.S. citizens, simultaneously con-
travening the self-sufficiency values of the disability rights and immigrant
communities. A noncitizen hoping to come to the United States or become a
legal permanent resident could not apply for public benefits, lest they be dis-
qualified as a public charge. Nondisabled immigrants, in contrast, faced no
difficulty in their path to permanent residence on the basis of disability. In
its exclusion of immigrants with disabilities, the Final Rule—not unlike the
Federal Immigration Restriction Act of 1924—clamored for homogeneity in
the U.S. populace.
also turned noncitizens away from social welfare, even citizens who were not subject to the
Final Rule. Weber, supra note 13, at 257–63 (describing the rule’s incentives to disenroll from
public benefits regardless of immigration status).
202. See, e .g ., Sarah Kliff, Kept at the Hospital on Coronavirus Fears, Now Facing Large
Medical Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/29/upshot
/coronavirus-surprise-medical-bills.html [https://perma.cc/6D5F-BMQS].
203. See, e .g ., Usha Lee McFarling, Fearing Deportation, Many Immigrants at Higher Risk
of Covid-19 Are Afraid to Seek Testing or Care, STAT NEWS (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/15/fearing-deportation-many-immigrants-at-higher-risk-of-
covid-19-are-afraid-to-seek-testing-or-care [https://perma.cc/L5GN-HDPM]; Joseph Shapiro,
Undocumented with COVID-19: Many Face a Long Recovery, Largely on Their Own, NPR
(Sept. 1, 2020, 6:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/01/905822094/undocumented-with-
covid-19-many-face-a-long-recovery-largely-on-their-own [https://perma.cc/5BAM-SVT2].
204. BABEY ET AL., supra note 92.
205. See Public Charge, supra note 12. Although USCIS permitted noncitizens to submit
statements about pandemic-triggered reliance on public benefits, this was limited to nonciti-
zens applying for adjustment of status and still does not provide an exemption. Instead, USCIS
offered a totality of circumstances analysis and emphasized relevance and credibility. Id .
